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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 The Building and Construction Trades Council (BCTC or 
"unions"), an unincorporated association composed of affiliated 
labor organizations, and Patrick Gillespie, its business manager, 
have moved to dissolve three consent judgments enforcing orders 
of the National Labor Relations Board and to vacate four consent 
contempt adjudications for violating the consent judgments.  The 
NLRB vigorously opposes the motion.  After giving the parties the 
opportunity to file written memoranda in support of their 
respective positions, we heard oral argument.  We will deny the 
motion for the reasons that follow. 
I. 
 The history of this case goes back more than twenty 
years.  On March 4, 1974 this court entered a consent judgment 
pursuant to stipulation by the parties enforcing an order issued 
by the NLRB against BCTC and J. Yorck, the business agent for the 
local union.  Some indication of the background of the order can 
be gleaned from the Board's Findings of Fact that the Firestone 
Tire and Rubber Company was engaged in the manufacture and sale 
of tires at Pottstown, Pennsylvania, and that it engaged the M.A. 
Matlock Construction Company as a subcontractor to perform 
certain work at its plant.  The agreed-upon order directed BCTC 
to cease and desist from picketing at the Pottstown plant and 
inducing or encouraging any of Firestone's employees to refuse to 
work or handle goods with the object of getting Firestone to 
cease doing business with Matlock.   
  The language of the order tracked section 8(b)(4)(B) of 
the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B), 
which prohibits secondary boycotts by labor organizations, and 
directed BCTC to cease and desist from: 
In any manner or by any means . . . engaging 
in, or inducing or encouraging any individual 
employed by . . . any . . . person engaged in 
commerce or in an industry affecting commerce 
to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the 
course of his employment . . . to perform any 
service, or in any manner or by any means, 
threatening, coercing, or restraining . . . 
any . . . person engaged in commerce or in an 
industry affecting commerce where, in either 
case, an object thereof is forcing or 
requiring . . . any . . . person . . . to 
cease doing business with . . . any other 
person. 
Exhibit A to Affidavit of Patrick Gillespie at 3. 
 In 1980, this court was again presented with a Decision 
and Order of the NLRB reflecting a settlement stipulation and a 
consent judgment, which we entered on November 28, 1980, that 
provided that the unions would cease and desist from engaging in 
a secondary boycott, this time of Atlantic Richfield Company 
(Arco) and Gulf Oil Company.  Specifically prohibited was any 
action encouraging employees of Gulf, Arco or others to refuse to 
work or handle any goods with the object of requiring Gulf, Arco 
or others to cease doing business with Refinery and Industrial 
Maintenance, Inc., a company engaged in the business of providing 
maintenance and repair work for refineries and industrial plants 
from its Eddystone, Pennsylvania facility.  The order enforced by 
this consent judgment contained the same language quoted above. 
Exhibit B to Gillespie affidavit. 
  On May 24, 1982, following proceedings brought by the 
NLRB to hold BCTC in civil contempt, BCTC stipulated that it was 
in civil contempt of the judgments entered March 4, 1974 and 
November 28, 1980 and consented to the entry of a Contempt 
Adjudication.  The adjudication ordered BCTC to purge the 
contempt by, inter alia, complying with the consent judgments and 
imposed a fine of $6500 for each future violation and $500 per 
day that each such violation continued.   Exhibit D to Gillespie 
affidavit. 
 Almost contemporaneously, the NLRB once again found 
itself faced with charges that BCTC was responsible for secondary 
boycotts, and once again it entered a Decision and Order, this 
time on February 22, 1983, approving a Settlement Stipulation 
that BCTC would cease and desist from such activity designed to 
coerce anyone from dealing with a long list of companies.  Once 
again, this court entered a consent judgment, on June 10, 1983, 
which enforced the order containing language requiring BCTC to 
cease and desist from the secondary boycott activity.  Exhibit C 
to Gillespie affidavit.  Significantly, one of the charging 
parties in the 1983 matter, Schnabel Associates, Inc., a company 
engaged in the construction business as a general contractor from 
its Harleysville, Pennsylvania facility, objected to the 
inclusion in the Settlement Stipulation of the "nonadmission 
clause" traditional in such settlements.  Schnabel argued that 
the stipulation should contain an admission of liability, and 
cited "the Respondent's proclivity to violate the Act" in support 
of its objection.  Id. at 2.  The General Counsel took the 
 position before the Board "that a nonadmission clause is not 
inappropriate under the circumstances of this case," and that he 
was satisfied that "the Settlement Stipulation fully remedies the 
unfair labor practices alleged."  Id.  The Board upheld the 
General Counsel's position. 
 Nonetheless, on January 31, 1984 BCTC once again agreed 
to a consent contempt adjudication for violating the March 4, 
1974 and November 28, 1980 judgments and the May 24, 1982 
contempt adjudication.  This adjudication required payment of a 
compliance fine of $3,000 to purge BCTC of the contempt, imposed 
a compliance fine of $13,000 for each future violation, and set a 
further compliance fine of $1,000 a day for each continuing 
violation.  See Exhibit E to Gillespie affidavit. 
 The activity prohibited by the three consent decrees 
and the two earlier consent contempt adjudications continued.  On 
August 4, 1986 and again on August 4, 1989 BCTC agreed to consent 
contempt adjudications which increased the stipulated violation 
and per diem fines.  See Exhibits F and H of the Gillespie 
affidavit.  The proceeding culminating in the 1986 consent 
adjudication had also been brought against the individual members 
of BCTC's Executive Board.  Under the 1989 consent adjudication 
Gillespie himself, the BCTC business manager, was deemed 
personally in contempt.  The 1989 contempt adjudication required 
BCTC and Gillespie to purge the contempt by, inter alia, 
complying with the prior judgments and contempt adjudications, 
notifying officers, agents, members and employees of BCTC and its 
affiliated unions of the contempt adjudication, and refraining 
 from authorizing and permitting picketing by any representatives 
or agents of BCTC without taking prescribed steps to ensure that 
the picketing will be lawful and permissible under the prior 
judgments and contempt adjudications.  BCTC was also assessed the 
sum of $250,000 for past noncompliance, with $150,000 payable in 
installments and $100,000 suspended on condition of future 
compliance.  The prospective fines against BCTC were increased to 
$100,000 per violation and $10,000 per day that each such 
violation continues.  A prospective fine of $5000 per violation 
and $500 per day was imposed against the business manager and any 
other officer, employee, agent, or representative of BCTC who 
knowingly violates the order.  Finally, BCTC agreed that, upon 
filing of any unfair labor practice charge alleging acts falling 
within the scope of this court's prior orders and adjudications, 
it would furnish the NLRB with all evidence in its possession 
concerning the charge within 14 days of a request by the NLRB. 
 BCTC now moves to dissolve the consent judgments and 
vacate the contempt adjudications on the grounds that (1) BCTC 
has completely purged itself of contempt; (2) BCTC has completely 
complied for a significant length of time; (3) BCTC is suffering 
"undue hardships and vexatious harassment" because of the 
judgments and contempt adjudications; and (4) continued 
enforcement is no longer equitable. 
 The NLRB opposes the motion because (1) BCTC has not 
demonstrated that it has complied with and will comply with the 
judgments and contempt adjudications; (2) the purpose of the 
judgments and adjudications -- permanently restraining BCTC from 
 violating section 8(b)(4)(B) -- has not been accomplished; (3) 
BCTC has failed to show any substantial injury or hardship; and 
(4) BCTC has failed to demonstrate any other change of 
circumstances justifying exceptional relief. 
II. 
 The parties dispute the correct legal standard to be 
applied to BCTC's motion to dissolve the injunctions.  The NLRB 
would have us apply a standard culled from language used by the 
Supreme Court more than sixty years ago in United States v. Swift 
& Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932).  In Swift, the government had sued 
the five leading meat packers to dissolve a monopoly that they 
had acquired in meat products and which they were taking steps to 
extend into other foods.  In 1920, defendants entered into a 
consent decree consenting to some dismemberment and, inter alia, 
prohibiting them from manufacturing, selling or transporting any 
of 114 grocery products.  Although defendants managed to avoid 
the full impact of the decree through legal proceedings for a 
while, when they could no longer do so they moved to modify the 
decree, citing changed conditions in the industry.  The district 
court granted a modification to permit defendants to deal at 
wholesale in groceries.   
 The Supreme Court reversed, finding no "grievous wrong" 
arising from continued operation of the decree.  The Court stated 
that when a party seeks to modify or dissolve an injunction, 
entered by consent or otherwise, because of changed 
circumstances, the inquiry differs from the framing of a decree: 
 The inquiry . . . is whether the changes are 
so important that dangers, once substantial, 
have become attenuated to a shadow.  No doubt 
the defendants will be better off if the 
injunction is relaxed, but they are not 
suffering hardship so extreme and unexpected 
as to justify us in saying that they are the 
victims of oppression.  Nothing less than a 
clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new 
and unforeseen conditions should lead us to 
change what was decreed after years of 
litigation with the consent of all concerned. 
Id. at 119 (emphasis added).  
 BCTC argues that labor injunctions "enjoy a greater 
presumption of limited duration" than other injunctions.  BCTC 
Reply Memorandum of Law at 3.  Surprisingly, it relies for this 
proposition on Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 
Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941), in which the Court upheld an 
injunction imposed by the state supreme court prohibiting 
peaceful picketing as well as acts of violence by a union which 
had interfered with the distribution of the products of a dairy. 
Because of the heavy reliance BCTC places on the Milk Wagon 
Drivers Union case, we examine it closely. 
 The Supreme Court had previously held that state 
statutes prohibiting all picketing near an employer's place of 
business violated the constitutional protection of free speech. 
See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Carlson v. 
California, 310 U.S. 106 (1940).  The Milk Wagon Drivers Union 
case gave the Court the opportunity to consider again the 
constitutional issue of the right of a state to prohibit peaceful 
picketing.  In upholding the injunction, the Supreme Court 
explained that this case was different than the preceding cases 
 because of the coercive effect of the violence.  The following 
language repeatedly stressed by BCTC was written in the context 
of injunctions limiting the free speech right to picket, not in 
connection with any motion for modification of a consent decree 
or a litigated injunction applicable to labor injunctions in 
general:  
The injunction which we sustain is 
"permanent" only for the temporary period for 
which it may last.  It is justified only by 
the violence that induced it and only so long 
as it counteracts a continuing intimidation. 
Familiar equity procedure assures opportunity 
for modifying or vacating an injunction when 
its continuance is no longer warranted. 
Milk Wagon Drivers Union, 312 U.S. at 298.  The Court continued 
this paragraph by noting that there was no argument by the union 
that the coercive effect of the violence had disappeared.   
 Thus, the facts are not "closely parallel" as BCTC 
contends, nor does this language support BCTC's argument that the 
Supreme Court has "held" that labor injunctions are to be viewed 
in a different light.  To be sure, a "permanent" injunction does 
not automatically operate in perpetuity and a labor injunction, 
like any other injunction, may be modified or vacated according 
to "familiar equity procedure."  However, nothing in the Milk 
Wagon Drivers Union case suggests that labor injunctions enjoy 
any presumption of limited duration greater than any other 
injunction.    
 Nor does it suggest that Swift was not to be applied in 
labor cases.  This court has regularly applied Swift in 
evaluating a defendant's request for relief from an injunction, 
 both in labor cases and otherwise.  In International Bhd. of 
Teamsters v. Western Pa. Motor Carriers Ass'n, 660 F.2d 76 (3d 
Cir. 1981), an employers' association which had entered into a 
consent decree with the union that it would not engage in 
"spotting" (the practice of instructing a driver not to remain 
with the trailer during loading and unloading and assigning the 
driver to other duties) moved to modify the injunction so that it 
would apply only to the Allegheny County members.  We affirmed 
the district court's denial of the motion to modify, stating that 
the association had not made the necessary "showing of 
exceptional circumstances."  Id. at 85; see also United States v. 
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 818 F.2d 1077, 1088 (3d Cir. 
1987). 
 Similarly, in Mayberry v. Maroney, 558 F.2d 1159 (3d 
Cir. 1977), we denied modification of a consent decree entered in 
1973 that enjoined prison officials from confining any inmate at 
the State Correctional Institute at Pittsburgh in a basement 
facility known as the Behavior Adjustment Unit (BAU).  The 
district court had granted the motion of prison officials to 
vacate the decree so that unruly prisoners could be confined 
there on an emergency basis for a maximum of 48 hours.  We 
reversed, holding that where the parties agreed to and the court 
sanctioned the closing of an allegedly offensive facility, "the 
Commonwealth may not now artificially create its own 'changed 
circumstance,' and thus relieve itself from a free, calculated 
and deliberate choice, by offering a substitute remedy which 
provides a lesser safeguard against the injuries complained of on 
 behalf of the class."  Id. at 1163.  We recognized that the 
alternative remedy would have been more convenient for the 
defendants and might have been "neither unjust nor unreasonable," 
but we confined our inquiry to whether anything had happened to 
justify changing the decree, not how the decree might best have 
been framed.  Id. at 1163-64.  Inasmuch as the need to use the 
BAU in event of emergency was not found to be greater than that 
which existed at the time of the decree, the "changed 
circumstances" asserted by the defendants were insufficient to 
warrant vacating the decree.   
 Different considerations apply when the party seeking 
to modify the consent decree wishes to strengthen its prohibition 
because the purpose for which the decree had been framed has not 
been fully achieved.  In United States v. United Shoe Machinery 
Corp., 391 U.S. 244 (1968), the government sought a modification 
of a consent decree adopted to settle an antitrust case.  When 
the government sought further relief than that originally 
provided, defendant relied on Swift for its claim of the 
immutability of the original consent decree.  The Supreme Court 
reversed, explaining that nothing in Swift precludes such a 
modification "upon an appropriate showing."  Id. at 248. 
 The principal issue before us is to analyze the effect 
of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Rufo v. Inmates of 
Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992), on the standard 
previously applied to requests to modify an injunction.  In Rufo, 
four years after the modification of a consent decree which 
prohibited double bunking of pretrial detainees in a new jail to 
 be constructed, the county sheriff moved to modify the decree to 
allow double bunking, citing an increase in the pretrial detainee 
population.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5), which was 
promulgated more than a decade after the Swift decision, 
authorizes a court to grant relief from a final judgment if "it 
is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application."  The district court denied the sheriff's motion, 
holding that Rule 60(b)(5) codified the "grievous wrong" standard 
of Swift.  The Court of Appeals affirmed.  The Supreme Court 
disagreed.  
 In Rufo, the Court engaged in an extensive discussion 
of the considerations relevant to the issue before us.  It 
disagreed with the lower court's construction of Rule 60(b), 
explaining that Swift did not represent a hardening of the 
traditional flexible standard for modification of consent 
decrees.  Id. at 379.  It noted that the Court in Swift itself 
distinguished the facts before it from the case in which genuine 
changes required modification of a consent decree.  The "grievous 
wrong" standard was not intended to take on a "talismanic 
quality, warding off virtually all efforts to modify consent 
decrees."  Id. at 380.  Instead, the language of Rule 60(b) 
"permits a less stringent, more flexible standard" for relief 
from a final judgment and allows a court to decide when "it is no 
longer equitable that the judgment have prospective application." 
Id. 
 The Rufo Court then turned to the case before it, 
noting that the upsurge in institutional reform litigation since 
 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), has made a 
district court's ability to modify a decree in response to 
changed circumstances all the more important.  A flexible 
approach "is often essential to achieving the goals of reform 
litigation."  Rufo, 502 U.S. at 381.  The rigidity displayed by 
the district court was thus "neither required by Swift nor 
appropriate in the context of institutional reform litigation." 
Id. at 382. 
 Nonetheless, the Court inserted a note of caution, 
stating that modification is not warranted in all circumstances. 
It stated that even when seeking modification of an institutional 
reform consent decree, the party seeking modification must 
establish "that a significant change in circumstances warrants 
revision of the decree."  Id. at 383.  Rule 60(b)(5) does not 
authorize relief merely "when it is no longer convenient to live 
with the terms of a consent decree."  Id.  Modification may be 
appropriate when changed factual conditions make compliance with 
the decree substantially more onerous, when a decree becomes 
unworkable because of unforeseen obstacles, or when enforcement 
of the unmodified decree would be detrimental to the public 
interest.  Id. at 384.  However, modification should not 
ordinarily be granted "where a party relies on events that 
actually were anticipated at the time it entered into a decree." 
Id. at 385. 
 The Court stated in conclusion, "[W]e hold that the 
Swift 'grievous wrong' standard does not apply to requests to 
modify consent decrees stemming from institutional reform 
 litigation.  Under the flexible standard we adopt today, a party 
seeking modification of a consent decree must establish that a 
significant change in facts or law warrants revision of the 
decree and that the proposed modification is suitably tailored to 
the changed circumstance."  Id. at 393.  
 This court has not yet decided whether it should read 
the Supreme Court's decision in Rufo as generally applicable to 
modifications of consent decrees.  In Favia v. Indiana Univ. of 
Pa., 7 F.3d 332, 341 n.15 (3d Cir. 1993), we noted that "the 
Court in Rufo specifically limited its holding to the 
institutional reform setting," but we expressly reserved the 
question "whether Rufo entirely displaces the more rigid Swift 
standard." 
 The NLRB would have us limit Rufo to the specific 
problem of "the ability to alter the affirmative provisions of 
institutional reform consent decrees," a context in which there 
is a likelihood of significant changes occurring during the life 
of the decree.  Board's Opposition Memorandum at 12 (citing Rufo, 
502 U.S. at 380).  It urges us to adopt the rationale of the 
courts of appeals of the Sixth and Federal Circuits which it 
reads as treating the Rufo standard as limited to institutional 
reform litigation.  See W.L. Gore & Assoc. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 
977 F.2d 558 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (affirming a district court 
decision refusing to modify a consent decree that enjoined the 
defendant from infringing plaintiff's patent, but noting that 
less stringent Rufo modification standard applies to 
institutional consent decrees); Lorain NAACP v. Lorain Bd. of 
 Educ., 979 F.2d 1141, 1149 (6th Cir. 1992) (less stringent 
modification standard applies to institutional consent decrees 
because they are "fundamentally different" from private consent 
decrees, affect more than the rights of the immediate litigants, 
and present higher likelihood of significant changes due to their 
long life), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2998 (1993). 
 Two other courts of appeals have stated that Rufo gave 
the "coup de grace" to Swift and that the Rufo standard applies 
to all types of injunctive relief.  See United States v. Western 
Electric Co., 46 F.3d 1198, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (affirming 
modification of AT & T antitrust consent decree); In re Hendrix, 
986 F.2d 195, 198 (7th Cir. 1993) (affirming modification of 
bankruptcy discharge).  Another court has held that Rufo is not 
limited to litigation against a governmental entity, although it 
left open the question whether Rufo displaces Swift in all cases. 
Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 13 F.3d 33 (2d 
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 58 (1994). 
 We do not dwell upon the facts of the cases arising in 
the various circuits because we have now concluded, after 
considerable reflection, that it would be a mistake to limit the 
Supreme Court's decision in Rufo as the NLRB argues.  Although 
there is language in the opinion that speaks in terms of the 
issues that arise in connection with institutional reform cases, 
those references are attributable to the fact that the Rufo case 
arose in that context.  We deem more significant that much of the 
opinion represents an interpretation of the generally applicable 
Rule 60(b)(5) and a discussion of the equitable considerations 
 that courts must take into account in ruling on requests to 
modify injunctions.  In this respect, we agree with the court's 
statement in Western Electric that although the Rufo Court 
"interspersed its . . . discussion with references to 
institutional reform litigation," it did so in the context of 
interpreting Rule 60(b)(5), which does not draw distinctions 
based on the nature of the litigation.  46 F.3d at 1203.  But we 
reject Western Electric's more sweeping claim that there is no 
longer any place for Swift, particularly since the Supreme Court 
was careful in Rufo not to overrule Swift but to explain it.1  We 
deem it cautious to leave to the Supreme Court the province of 
overruling its own decisions, particularly since we conclude that 
petitioners are not entitled to relief under either standard. 
 In many respects, we agree with the approach enunciated 
by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Alexis Lichine & 
Cie. v. Sacha A. Lichine Estate Selections, Ltd., 45 F.3d 582 
(1st Cir. 1995), where the court declined to modify a consent 
decree entered following a commercial dispute between competing 
members of the same family which barred one party from using the 
trademarked name of the other in connection with its business.  
The court did not read Rufo as being confined in principle to 
institutional reform cases.  It stated instead that "Rule 
60(b)(5) sets forth the umbrella concept of 'equitable' that both 
                     
1While Judge Becker concurs in the judgment he would follow the 
holdings of United States v. Western Electric Co. and In re 
Hendrix, Op. at 15, that Rufo governs with respect to requested 
modification of all types of injunctive relief. 
 Swift and Rufo apply to particular, widely disparate fact 
situations."  Id. at 586. 
 The court noted Swift's distinction between permanent 
decrees and provisional or tentative decrees involving the 
supervision of changing conduct or conditions and stated, "Swift 
illustrates the former and Rufo the latter."  Id.  The court saw 
this difference "not as a limited dualism but as polar 
opposites of a continuum" in which each case must be located. Id.  
In the case before it, where the decree was based on a negotiated 
bargain in a commercial case between private parties who had been 
represented by counsel, the court refused to modify the 
injunction and emphasized the importance of finality.  The court 
noted that a different approach might be appropriate when 
commercial cases "involve issues more laden with a public 
interest, such as antitrust."  Id. at 586 n.2. 
 We believe that the generally applicable rule for 
modifying a previously issued judgment is that set forth in Rule 
60(b)(5), i.e., "that it is no longer equitable that the judgment 
should have prospective application."  It would be a mistake to 
view either Rufo or Swift as encapsulating a universal formula 
for deciding when that point has been reached.  Instead, each of 
those cases represents a response to a particular set of 
circumstances.  A court of equity cannot rely on a simple formula 
but must evaluate a number of potentially competing 
considerations to determine whether to modify or vacate an 
injunction entered by consent or otherwise. 
  Accordingly, the standard for modifying an injunction 
cannot depend on whether the case is characterized as an 
institutional reform case, a commercial dispute, or private or 
public litigation.  Different considerations may have greater or 
lesser prominence in different cases, not because the cases are 
characterized one way rather than another but because equity 
demands a flexible response to the unique conditions of each 
case.   
 We abjure establishing a rigid, pervasively applicable 
rule, although it may be helpful to set forth the factors that 
generally should be considered in deciding whether to modify an 
injunction.  These include the circumstances leading to entry of 
the injunction and the nature of the conduct sought to be 
prevented; the length of time since entry of the injunction;   
whether the party subject to its terms has complied or attempted 
to comply in good faith with the injunction; and the likelihood 
that the conduct or conditions sought to be prevented will recur 
absent the injunction.  Central to the court's consideration will 
be whether the modification is sought because changed conditions 
unforeseen by the parties have made compliance substantially more 
onerous or have made the decree unworkable.  Courts which have 
faced similar issues also have identified as a relevant factor 
whether the conduct previously enjoined has become legal due to a 
change in the law, see, e.g., System Federation No. 91 v. Wright, 
364 U.S. 642, 649-50 (1961); Gore, 977 F.2d at 561-63.  On the 
other hand, the fact that the party is now subject to a contempt 
sanction for violation of the decree in addition to the statutory 
 punishment is not generally a factor to be considered.  NLRB v. 
General Motors, 179 F.2d 221, 222 (2d Cir. 1950).  Nor is the 
mere fact that the injunction is in prohibitory language rather 
than "mandatory" language in itself a factor that makes it 
resistant to modification, as the NLRB urges.  See Western 
Electric, 46 F.3d at 1206. 
 Inasmuch as it is unlikely that all of the factors will 
tilt in one direction, the court must balance the hardship to the 
party subject to the injunction against the benefits to be 
obtained from maintaining the injunction.  Cf. 7 James W. Moore, 
Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 60.26[4], at 60-258 to 60-260 (2d ed. 
1995) ("A continuing injunction may be modified when the 
modification would work no harm to the one for whom the 
injunction ran and would serve a beneficial purpose for the 
movant.  A subsequent change in the controlling facts on which 
the injunction rested . . . may warrant a modification or 
vacation of the continuing restraint.").  Finally, the court 
should determine whether the objective of the decree has been 
achieved and whether continued enforcement would be detrimental 
to the public interest.  In this connection, cases such as Rufo 
which deal with institutional reform, particularly in the context 
of federal courts' supervision over state institutions, require 
that the federal courts be sensitive to the unique federalism 
issues presented.  See, e.g., Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 47 
F.3d 1311, 1331 (3d Cir. 1995).  It follows that the interest in 
finality of judgments may assume greater or lesser prominence 
according to the nature of the case and the private and public 
 interests implicated, but should not be either deprecated or 
ignored. 
III. 
 Having sketched the general principles, we conclude 
that application of them to this case leads us ineluctably to 
resolution of the issue before us.  BCTC bases its contention 
that it is no longer equitable for the judgments to have 
prospective application on the allegations in the Gillespie 
affidavit that it has fully complied with the decrees for the 
last six years and is suffering vexatious harassment and undue 
hardship due to the continuing existence of the decrees.  We 
examine each contention in turn. 
A. 
 We will assume arguendo, as Gillespie states in his 
affidavit, that from August 4, 1989 to the present "BCTC has not 
committed any acts nor engaged in any conduct in violation of the 
outstanding consent contempt adjudications and consent decree 
injunctions."  Affidavit of Patrick Gillespie ¶ 31.  However, we 
are unwilling to hold, and BCTC cites no persuasive authority, 
that the mere passage of time and temporary compliance are 
themselves sufficient to constitute the type of changed 
circumstances that warrant lifting of an injunction, and 
certainly not an injunction under the circumstances of this case. 
 BCTC relies principally on this court's affirmance of 
the dissolution of a permanent injunction that restrained the 
defendant from violating certain securities laws and regulations 
four years after its entry.  See SEC v. Warren, 583 F.2d 115 (3d 
 Cir. 1978).  In 1973, Warren, the defendant, had consented to the 
entry of a decree that enjoined him from violating the margin 
requirements of the Securities and Exchange Act and Regulation U. 
In 1977 Warren moved to dissolve the injunction.  Following an 
evidentiary hearing, the district court made findings that 
approximately ten years had passed since the violation and four 
years since entry of the injunction, during which time the 
violation did not recur; the violation itself was of limited 
duration; and Warren suffered "personal humiliation and business 
embarrassment" as a result of the injunction.  Id. at 122. 
Moreover, an intervening change in regulations diminished the 
need for administrative enforcement by contempt.  On appeal, we 
rejected the SEC's argument that Warren had not satisfied the 
Swift standard, then considered the prevailing approach. Instead, 
we stated that Warren's "technical violation of the margin 
requirements . . . in no way approaches the outrageous conduct 
enjoined in Swift."  Warren, 583 F.2d at 121.  Unlike Swift, no 
great public interest was implicated, and the purpose of the 
injunction appeared to have been fully achieved.  In light of 
these circumstances, we concluded that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in dissolving the injunction. 
 BCTC emphasizes the paragraph in Warren where we stated 
that in weighing the convenience of "enforcing a future violation 
by contempt proceedings," we must determine whether in the 
present circumstances "the decree works extreme and unnecessary 
hardship upon the defendants."  Id.  The facts before us in this 
case are far different than those in Warren where the defendant 
 committed a "single isolated offense in an esoteric area of the 
law," which was voluntarily corrected within six months and never 
repeated, and did not resist the injunction once it was entered. 
Id.   Here, by contrast, BCTC consented to the entry of three 
different consent decrees over a period of nine years that 
reflected charges based on substantially similar conduct at 
different sites affecting different employers.  The statutory 
secondary boycott provisions that BCTC was restrained from 
violating are neither technical nor complex.  The entry of four 
consent contempt adjudications against BCTC in a period of seven 
years reflects, at the very least, repeated violations by BCTC, 
and in later years by its officials, of the prohibitions which it 
had previously voluntarily agreed to observe.  BCTC's history of 
compliance for the last six years does not erase its history of 
noncompliance, as evidenced by the contempt adjudications. 
 BCTC also refers us to the Supreme Court's decision in 
Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249-50 
(1991), where the Court held that a school desegregation decree 
could be dissolved if the defendant had complied in good faith 
with the decree since it was entered and if the vestiges of past 
discrimination had been eliminated to the extent practicable. 
BCTC argues that Dowell permits dissolution of the decrees in 
this case on a showing that it has fully complied with the 
decrees.  Otherwise, BCTC claims that it will be subject to the 
type of "judicial tutelage for the indefinite future" referred to 
in Dowell.  Id. at 249. 
  The situation before us is hardly analogous to the  
school desegregation case at issue in Dowell, which presented 
"[c]onsiderations based on the allocation of powers within our 
federal system."  Id. at 248.  Federal supervision of local 
school systems was intended as a temporary measure to remedy past 
discrimination, and was "not intended to operate in perpetuity" 
or to displace local control over education beyond the extent 
necessary to correct a constitutional violation.  Id. 
 Even assuming that the principles announced in Dowell 
extend to this case notwithstanding the unique context of school 
desegregation, BCTC has not shown, as the Board of Education 
showed in Dowell, that it has complied with the decrees since 
they were entered.  Indeed, although it is not set forth in 
Gillespie's affidavit, BCTC's counsel stated at oral argument, 
and we fully accept his statement, that the unions have not 
engaged in any picketing for a large portion of the six years. 
There is therefore no background upon which any findings could be 
made that would show that BCTC has in fact learned how to picket 
without treading on the prohibitions against secondary boycott 
contained both in the law and the various negotiated consent 
decrees.  BCTC's statement that it "has fully transformed its 
conduct into a model of lawful compliance," BCTC Memorandum at 5, 
must be evaluated in light of that decision not to picket at all. 
We can no more assume "lawful compliance" for six years with the 
secondary boycott prohibitions than we could assume a design 
trademark infringer had learned to produce a non-infringing 
product from its decision not to produce a comparable product at 
 all.  Under these circumstances, the mere passage of a six-year 
period of alleged compliance with the decrees cannot be the basis 
for a modification of the decrees.  
B. 
 As a separate basis in support of its motion, BCTC 
contends that it has met its burden to show that there has been a 
change in facts sufficiently significant to warrant dissolution 
of the injunctions and that dissolution is suitably tailored to 
the changed circumstances.  In support of this argument, it 
argues that employers and the NLRB have used the injunctions and 
adjudications as a "sword of Damocles" over it, "repeatedly 
bringing baseless charges" of unfair labor practices, which were 
then withdrawn, "with the aim of harassing the Council and 
threatening the imposition of further fines and sanctions." 
Affidavit of Patrick Gillespie ¶ 32.  In a somewhat related vein, 
it also contends that the compliance and recordkeeping 
requirements of the most recent contempt adjudication result in 
extreme hardship to its members because they inhibit the members' 
rights. 
 We do not take lightly a contention that the rights of 
labor union members to freedom of association and expression 
protected by both the Constitution and federal law have been and 
are being repressed by decrees which this court has approved. 
However, it was BCTC's repeated failure to observe the decrees to 
which it had agreed that led to the provisions which it now 
claims inhibit picketing.  The Supreme Court has stated that 
modification of a decree is not ordinarily warranted when a party 
 relies on events actually anticipated at the time it entered into 
the decree.  Rufo, 502 U.S. at 385.  BCTC has not identified any 
significant hardship to which it and its members are subject that 
was unforeseen at the time it agreed to the 1989 contempt 
adjudication, the decree that imposes the procedure for 
establishing a picket line and the consequent recordkeeping that 
it now contends are burdensome.  Nor did BCTC make any effort to 
propose to the NLRB even a modest modification of the particular 
requirements of picket line procedure which it claims in 
conclusory fashion are so burdensome that they warrant wholesale 
dissolution of the injunction.  BCTC itself explains that the 
detailed procedure of the 1989 decree was inserted "to guard 
against violations of the Court's judgments."  BCTC Memorandum at 
4.  It does not contend, as we deemed relevant in Warren, "that 
the decree is not properly adapted to accomplishing its 
purposes."  583 F.2d at 120 (quotation omitted). 
  While the potential for contempt fines, particularly 
the high fines to which it is now subject, certainly heightens 
the stakes for BCTC, those progressively increasing fines -- to 
which it agreed -- were raised to their present level only after 
the earlier less severe sanctions proved ineffective.  Therefore, 
we need not decide the equity vel non of including a prospective 
noncompliance fine at the outset, see Blankenship & Assoc. v. 
NLRB, 54 F.3d 447, 449 (7th Cir. 1995), particularly because 
these fines accrue with each day of continuing violations.  See 
id. at 450.  Moreover, any attempt at a contempt adjudication, 
even on the basis of a stipulated fine, would entitle BCTC and 
 those subject to the order to judicial overview.  See, e.g., 
Harris, 47 F.3d at 1321-25.  We have no question that the courts 
will be able to distinguish between intentional violations of the 
decrees and unjustified harassment by what BCTC denominates as 
"vicious anti-labor law firms and employers."  BCTC Memorandum at 
10.  The few instances referred to in the Gillespie affidavit do 
not support a claim of unfair or unwarranted wholesale 
harassment. 
   Nothing shown by BCTC approaches the type of changed 
circumstances which we held justified a modification in 
Philadelphia Welfare Rights Org. v. Shapp, 602 F.2d 1114 (3d Cir. 
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1026 (1980).  In that case, after 
Pennsylvania agreed in a consent decree to provide certain 
medical services to a specified number of welfare recipients by a 
date certain, it moved to vacate or modify the decree, contending 
that it had attempted good faith compliance with the numerical 
requirements but fell short because eligible recipients refused 
services or failed to show for appointments and because of a 
shortage of participating physicians and dentists.  It introduced 
evidence that it had committed substantial resources to complying 
with the decree and that the total population eligible for 
services was significantly lower than that expected at the time 
of the decree due to declining welfare rolls.   
 We affirmed the district court's order eliminating the 
numerical requirement, noting that this requirement had proven 
impossible of performance due to circumstances beyond the 
defendants' control and not contemplated by the court or the 
 parties at the time of the decree.  We held that where an 
affirmative obligation is imposed on the assumption that it is 
realistically achievable and defendants have made a good faith 
effort to comply, but compliance has not been achieved, "a court 
of equity has power to modify the injunction in light of 
experience."  Id. at 1120-21.   
 In this case, BCTC has made no showing that changed 
circumstances have made adherence to the compliance procedure 
substantially more onerous or have made the compliance procedure 
unworkable.   
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny BCTC's motion 
to dissolve the consent judgments and vacate the consent contempt 
adjudications. 
 
                            
 
 
